http://wayangparty.com/?p=7630
By Gunslinger, Guest Columnist
The need for deterrence against potential aggressors is indisputable for this city state. In fact, there is a very strong case for deterrence and there is historical precedence that small states in the correct context with the right capabilities can achieve this. During World War 2, land locked Switzerland avoided Nazi Germany’s invasion through its difficult mountainous terrain, its citizen army, sheer grit and pride and without doubt a little complicity.
Yet, it would be interesting to see how the SAF might attempt to achieve a swift and decisive victory should deterrence fail. A military victory is usually defined as meeting military objectives that would fulfil political objectives. Thus, we would need to estimate what might be the SAF’s military objectives.
For this, Tim Huxley’s “Defending the Lion City” is revealing. Singapore’s leaders evidently believe that the best defence is offence and this is reflected in the order of battle of the SAF: amphibious landing ship tanks; heavy troop lift helicopters; F-16s and F-15s with conformal fuel tanks (increased striking range), the latter being F-15E Strike Eagles on steroids; air refuelling tankers; main battle tanks etc. The concept of “forward defence” described by Tim Huxley is therefore quite apt. With such offensive and power projection capabilities, she is probably more keen on punishing an aggressor, hitting where it really hurts and causing some long term damage rather than just beating off an attack.
This concept becomes even more credible when the nature of the national service is considered. Previously two and a half years of service for most young men, it was shortened a few years ago to two years. However, this should be considered a very lengthy period for a country outside a war zone or hot spot. Taiwan has only a 1 year conscription period and are considering a fully professional military force by 2014. Furthermore, the conscripts are not only trained in basic warfare but probably go through at least one exercise at the brigade or even divisional level.
On the MINDEF website, you would find information on overseas training exercises such as Wallaby in Australia resembling major combat operations. With emphasis on combined arms and integrated air force army operations, it is not unfathomable that the SAF’s defensive doctrine involve invading an aggressor. After all, Singapore’s urban areas are hardly the best places to run divisional level combined arms, with air force support.
The necessity of a short and brutal war is obviously not lost on Singapore’s Ivy League leaders. This is reflected in the SAF’s mission, doctrine and composition. It is unlikely that the SAF would or could persecute a protracted war. After all, mobilising her entire reserve forces would grind her economy to an abrupt halt. The composition of the RSAF’s offensive capabilities is also probably scaled to inflict maximum damage in the shortest time possible.
Geopolitics have immense influence in this region where one of the world’s most important shipping lanes passes through. Today, an estimated 80% and 90% of China’s and Japan’s energy supplies respectively pass through the Malacca Straits. Singapore is also a vital port and transit point for American forces between the Indian and Pacific oceans. Any armed conflict will certainly invite “international” condemnation, swift economic sanctions, international pressure and even military intervention.
MINDEF constantly reminds the Singapore public (through their website) about the British failure to defend Singapore during WW2, and that the SAF is the only guarantor for security. While there is some truth in it, they also conveniently avoid mentioning that Singapore would probably have been a much easier target without the British. They also forget to add that all countries will dash headlong to protect their own vital interests. The international community will not allow the Malacca straits to be turned into a war zone as too much is at stake for them. International action against piracy at the Horn of Africa and Japanese proactive participation in keeping the Malacca straits free of pirates are further proof. Numerous factors converge to limit the scale of a armed conflict that would threaten trade through the Malacca Straits.
Using Israel’s latest experience in Gaza and in Lebanon in 2006, the SAF would have no more than about 3 weeks to 1 month to achieve her objectives before being forced to the negotiating table for a ceasefire. This is an optimistic estimate given that Singapore does not have much leverage over the major powers nor does she have the powerful congressional lobbies that Israel possesses and uses to great effect.
Given the need to achieve a “swift and decisive victory” in this short time frame, the SAF faces a nearly impossible task although this article does not intend to cast doubt on her doubtlessly impressive operational capabilities. In fact, we shall assume that the SAF would face little opposition in a conventional face off with the Malaysia armed forces.
Yet, the ultra urbanisation of Singapore and to a lesser extent southern Johor poses immense problems to any invading army. Civilian casualties and collateral damage are almost impossible to avoid, resulting in loss of legitimacy and increased pressure to end hostilities. Case in point, the Israelis had to stop their operations in Lebanon in 2006 due to international pressure although they had international support at the beginning of the war.
Armies also advance at a snail’s pace in urban areas. The Pakistani army took more than 6 months to rout the Taliban in the tribal controlled areas which are dotted with little villages, unlike the dense cities in Singapore and southern Johor. In the process, they also had to bulldoze most of the villages. The SAF is therefore faced with a quagmire : avoid the urban zones and risk artillery and rocket attacks fired from these areas or enter the zones and fight protracted bloody battles.
Neither option is pretty. While the attacks may not do serious physical damage, the psychological damage could be severe, demonstrating the inefficacy of the SAF in defending against primitive rocket or artillery attacks. So in fact, the SAF would be forced to enter these zones to attempt to control them and stop the attacks. However, the recent Israeli wars have shown that it is impossible to stop them, despite the fact that the Israelis possessed one of the most effective armies in the world as well as the most technologically advanced weaponry available. They fared better recently in Gaza but at immense cost in terms of collateral damage and legitimacy of their cause. The ensuing international outrage is now threatening their trade status with the European Union.
A conventional conflict also assumes that both parties are intent on pitting their conventional forces against each other. An opponent can choose to prolong the conflict while preserving her forces. Such a strategy will bear down on Singapore’s weaknesses, wearing down her forces and economy while rallying for a strategic attack at the right time.
This strategy (not tactic) is in fact employed throughout the world by terrorist organisations. The Malaysian armed forces already appears to understand the concept of preserving forces, placing her most valued military assets out of easy reach from Singapore. Their newest Sukhoi-30MKM will be based in northern West Malaysia, yet they still have the range to strike the city state. Their new state of the art Scorpene submarines will be based in Sepanggar Bay in Sabah.
Even in the unlikely case where Singapore does achieve a “swift and decisive victory”, the effects of a war will have far greater and longer lasting effects on her than on any of her neighbours even after a cease fire. Wanting to avenge themselves, an intelligent adversary will bleed Singapore slowly to economic disaster with occasional skirmishes and plenty of rhetoric.
Without a hinterland or natural resources, she will be forced to look further afield to import her daily needs. The increased cost of doing business would drive away investors. Local SMEs already deprived of an adequate domestic market will be put out of business. Increased security measures needed to guard against ex-enemies will strain resources. In this context, war is not the best way to bring down Singapore. Bleeding her to death would be much easier and cheaper. This has not yet happened because it is much more profitable to cooperate with her.
This does not mean that Singapore is not defendable. It is certainly defendable. As an island, invading forces need to possess a significant amphibious or bridging capability since trying to dash the causeway or the second link, which might be blown up, under fire is suicidal.
The urban environment is a huge booby trap and makes it difficult for an invader to control the terrain and progress quickly to key objectives. These are “natural” obstacles that are extremely difficult to overcome even without significant participation of armed resistance. But this article is long enough, and I will present an alternative defence policy later and an alternative NS policy. For now, it suffice to say that MINDEF’s policies are misguided, do not take into account today’s realities and will not bring “swift and decisive victory”. Taxpayer’s money has been wasted in pursuing this current defence strategy and our youths do not need to go through a 2 year NS period.
Monday, April 13, 2009
Saturday, April 11, 2009
Our bloated defence budget: A swift and decisive victory
Our bloated defence budget: A swift and decisive victory
http://wayangparty.com/?p=7630
By Darth Vader, Guest Columnist
The need for deterrence against potential aggressors is indisputable for this city state. In fact, there is a very strong case for deterrence and there is historical precedence that small states in the correct context with the right capabilities can achieve this. During World War 2, land locked Switzerland avoided Nazi Germany’s invasion through its difficult mountainous terrain, its citizen army, sheer grit and pride and without doubt a little complicity.
Yet, it would be interesting to see how the SAF might attempt to achieve a swift and decisive victory should deterrence fail. A military victory is usually defined as meeting military objectives that would fulfil political objectives. Thus, we would need to estimate what might be the SAF’s military objectives.
For this, Tim Huxley’s “Defending the Lion City” is revealing. Singapore’s leaders evidently believe that the best defence is offence and this is reflected in the order of battle of the SAF: amphibious landing ship tanks; heavy troop lift helicopters; F-16s and F-15s with conformal fuel tanks (increased striking range), the latter being F-15E Strike Eagles on steroids; air refuelling tankers; main battle tanks etc. The concept of “forward defence” described by Tim Huxley is therefore quite apt. With such offensive and power projection capabilities, she is probably more keen on punishing an aggressor, hitting where it really hurts and causing some long term damage rather than just beating off an attack.
This concept becomes even more credible when the nature of the national service is considered. Previously two and a half years of service for most young men, it was shortened a few years ago to two years. However, this should be considered a very lengthy period for a country outside a war zone or hot spot. Taiwan has only a 1 year conscription period and are considering a fully professional military force by 2014. Furthermore, the conscripts are not only trained in basic warfare but probably go through at least one exercise at the brigade or even divisional level.
On the MINDEF website, you would find information on overseas training exercises such as Wallaby in Australia resembling major combat operations. With emphasis on combined arms and integrated air force army operations, it is not unfathomable that the SAF’s defensive doctrine involve invading an aggressor. After all, Singapore’s urban areas are hardly the best places to run divisional level combined arms, with air force support.
The necessity of a short and brutal war is obviously not lost on Singapore’s Ivy League leaders. This is reflected in the SAF’s mission, doctrine and composition. It is unlikely that the SAF would or could persecute a protracted war. After all, mobilising her entire reserve forces would grind her economy to an abrupt halt. The composition of the RSAF’s offensive capabilities is also probably scaled to inflict maximum damage in the shortest time possible.
Geopolitics have immense influence in this region where one of the world’s most important shipping lanes passes through. Today, an estimated 80% and 90% of China’s and Japan’s energy supplies respectively pass through the Malacca Straits. Singapore is also a vital port and transit point for American forces between the Indian and Pacific oceans. Any armed conflict will certainly invite “international” condemnation, swift economic sanctions, international pressure and even military intervention.
MINDEF constantly reminds the Singapore public (through their website) about the British failure to defend Singapore during WW2, and that the SAF is the only guarantor for security. While there is some truth in it, they also conveniently avoid mentioning that Singapore would probably have been a much easier target without the British. They also forget to add that all countries will dash headlong to protect their own vital interests. The international community will not allow the Malacca straits to be turned into a war zone as too much is at stake for them. International action against piracy at the Horn of Africa and Japanese proactive participation in keeping the Malacca straits free of pirates are further proof. Numerous factors converge to limit the scale of a armed conflict that would threaten trade through the Malacca Straits.
Using Israel’s latest experience in Gaza and in Lebanon in 2006, the SAF would have no more than about 3 weeks to 1 month to achieve her objectives before being forced to the negotiating table for a ceasefire. This is an optimistic estimate given that Singapore does not have much leverage over the major powers nor does she have the powerful congressional lobbies that Israel possesses and uses to great effect.
Given the need to achieve a “swift and decisive victory” in this short time frame, the SAF faces a nearly impossible task although this article does not intend to cast doubt on her doubtlessly impressive operational capabilities. In fact, we shall assume that the SAF would face little opposition in a conventional face off with the Malaysia armed forces.
Yet, the ultra urbanisation of Singapore and to a lesser extent southern Johor poses immense problems to any invading army. Civilian casualties and collateral damage are almost impossible to avoid, resulting in loss of legitimacy and increased pressure to end hostilities. Case in point, the Israelis had to stop their operations in Lebanon in 2006 due to international pressure although they had international support at the beginning of the war.
Armies also advance at a snail’s pace in urban areas. The Pakistani army took more than 6 months to rout the Taliban in the tribal controlled areas which are dotted with little villages, unlike the dense cities in Singapore and southern Johor. In the process, they also had to bulldoze most of the villages. The SAF is therefore faced with a quagmire : avoid the urban zones and risk artillery and rocket attacks fired from these areas or enter the zones and fight protracted bloody battles.
Neither option is pretty. While the attacks may not do serious physical damage, the psychological damage could be severe, demonstrating the inefficacy of the SAF in defending against primitive rocket or artillery attacks. So in fact, the SAF would be forced to enter these zones to attempt to control them and stop the attacks. However, the recent Israeli wars have shown that it is impossible to stop them, despite the fact that the Israelis possessed one of the most effective armies in the world as well as the most technologically advanced weaponry available. They fared better recently in Gaza but at immense cost in terms of collateral damage and legitimacy of their cause. The ensuing international outrage is now threatening their trade status with the European Union.
A conventional conflict also assumes that both parties are intent on pitting their conventional forces against each other. An opponent can choose to prolong the conflict while preserving her forces. Such a strategy will bear down on Singapore’s weaknesses, wearing down her forces and economy while rallying for a strategic attack at the right time.
This strategy (not tactic) is in fact employed throughout the world by terrorist organisations. The Malaysian armed forces already appears to understand the concept of preserving forces, placing her most valued military assets out of easy reach from Singapore. Their newest Sukhoi-30MKM will be based in northern West Malaysia, yet they still have the range to strike the city state. Their new state of the art Scorpene submarines will be based in Sepanggar Bay in Sabah.
Even in the unlikely case where Singapore does achieve a “swift and decisive victory”, the effects of a war will have far greater and longer lasting effects on her than on any of her neighbours even after a cease fire. Wanting to avenge themselves, an intelligent adversary will bleed Singapore slowly to economic disaster with occasional skirmishes and plenty of rhetoric.
Without a hinterland or natural resources, she will be forced to look further afield to import her daily needs. The increased cost of doing business would drive away investors. Local SMEs already deprived of an adequate domestic market will be put out of business. Increased security measures needed to guard against ex-enemies will strain resources. In this context, war is not the best way to bring down Singapore. Bleeding her to death would be much easier and cheaper. This has not yet happened because it is much more profitable to cooperate with her.
This does not mean that Singapore is not defendable. It is certainly defendable. As an island, invading forces need to possess a significant amphibious or bridging capability since trying to dash the causeway or the second link, which might be blown up, under fire is suicidal.
The urban environment is a huge booby trap and makes it difficult for an invader to control the terrain and progress quickly to key objectives. These are “natural” obstacles that are extremely difficult to overcome even without significant participation of armed resistance. But this article is long enough, and I will present an alternative defence policy later and an alternative NS policy. For now, it suffice to say that MINDEF’s policies are misguided, do not take into account today’s realities and will not bring “swift and decisive victory”. Taxpayer’s money has been wasted in pursuing this current defence strategy and our youths do not need to go through a 2 year NS period.
http://wayangparty.com/?p=7630
By Darth Vader, Guest Columnist
The need for deterrence against potential aggressors is indisputable for this city state. In fact, there is a very strong case for deterrence and there is historical precedence that small states in the correct context with the right capabilities can achieve this. During World War 2, land locked Switzerland avoided Nazi Germany’s invasion through its difficult mountainous terrain, its citizen army, sheer grit and pride and without doubt a little complicity.
Yet, it would be interesting to see how the SAF might attempt to achieve a swift and decisive victory should deterrence fail. A military victory is usually defined as meeting military objectives that would fulfil political objectives. Thus, we would need to estimate what might be the SAF’s military objectives.
For this, Tim Huxley’s “Defending the Lion City” is revealing. Singapore’s leaders evidently believe that the best defence is offence and this is reflected in the order of battle of the SAF: amphibious landing ship tanks; heavy troop lift helicopters; F-16s and F-15s with conformal fuel tanks (increased striking range), the latter being F-15E Strike Eagles on steroids; air refuelling tankers; main battle tanks etc. The concept of “forward defence” described by Tim Huxley is therefore quite apt. With such offensive and power projection capabilities, she is probably more keen on punishing an aggressor, hitting where it really hurts and causing some long term damage rather than just beating off an attack.
This concept becomes even more credible when the nature of the national service is considered. Previously two and a half years of service for most young men, it was shortened a few years ago to two years. However, this should be considered a very lengthy period for a country outside a war zone or hot spot. Taiwan has only a 1 year conscription period and are considering a fully professional military force by 2014. Furthermore, the conscripts are not only trained in basic warfare but probably go through at least one exercise at the brigade or even divisional level.
On the MINDEF website, you would find information on overseas training exercises such as Wallaby in Australia resembling major combat operations. With emphasis on combined arms and integrated air force army operations, it is not unfathomable that the SAF’s defensive doctrine involve invading an aggressor. After all, Singapore’s urban areas are hardly the best places to run divisional level combined arms, with air force support.
The necessity of a short and brutal war is obviously not lost on Singapore’s Ivy League leaders. This is reflected in the SAF’s mission, doctrine and composition. It is unlikely that the SAF would or could persecute a protracted war. After all, mobilising her entire reserve forces would grind her economy to an abrupt halt. The composition of the RSAF’s offensive capabilities is also probably scaled to inflict maximum damage in the shortest time possible.
Geopolitics have immense influence in this region where one of the world’s most important shipping lanes passes through. Today, an estimated 80% and 90% of China’s and Japan’s energy supplies respectively pass through the Malacca Straits. Singapore is also a vital port and transit point for American forces between the Indian and Pacific oceans. Any armed conflict will certainly invite “international” condemnation, swift economic sanctions, international pressure and even military intervention.
MINDEF constantly reminds the Singapore public (through their website) about the British failure to defend Singapore during WW2, and that the SAF is the only guarantor for security. While there is some truth in it, they also conveniently avoid mentioning that Singapore would probably have been a much easier target without the British. They also forget to add that all countries will dash headlong to protect their own vital interests. The international community will not allow the Malacca straits to be turned into a war zone as too much is at stake for them. International action against piracy at the Horn of Africa and Japanese proactive participation in keeping the Malacca straits free of pirates are further proof. Numerous factors converge to limit the scale of a armed conflict that would threaten trade through the Malacca Straits.
Using Israel’s latest experience in Gaza and in Lebanon in 2006, the SAF would have no more than about 3 weeks to 1 month to achieve her objectives before being forced to the negotiating table for a ceasefire. This is an optimistic estimate given that Singapore does not have much leverage over the major powers nor does she have the powerful congressional lobbies that Israel possesses and uses to great effect.
Given the need to achieve a “swift and decisive victory” in this short time frame, the SAF faces a nearly impossible task although this article does not intend to cast doubt on her doubtlessly impressive operational capabilities. In fact, we shall assume that the SAF would face little opposition in a conventional face off with the Malaysia armed forces.
Yet, the ultra urbanisation of Singapore and to a lesser extent southern Johor poses immense problems to any invading army. Civilian casualties and collateral damage are almost impossible to avoid, resulting in loss of legitimacy and increased pressure to end hostilities. Case in point, the Israelis had to stop their operations in Lebanon in 2006 due to international pressure although they had international support at the beginning of the war.
Armies also advance at a snail’s pace in urban areas. The Pakistani army took more than 6 months to rout the Taliban in the tribal controlled areas which are dotted with little villages, unlike the dense cities in Singapore and southern Johor. In the process, they also had to bulldoze most of the villages. The SAF is therefore faced with a quagmire : avoid the urban zones and risk artillery and rocket attacks fired from these areas or enter the zones and fight protracted bloody battles.
Neither option is pretty. While the attacks may not do serious physical damage, the psychological damage could be severe, demonstrating the inefficacy of the SAF in defending against primitive rocket or artillery attacks. So in fact, the SAF would be forced to enter these zones to attempt to control them and stop the attacks. However, the recent Israeli wars have shown that it is impossible to stop them, despite the fact that the Israelis possessed one of the most effective armies in the world as well as the most technologically advanced weaponry available. They fared better recently in Gaza but at immense cost in terms of collateral damage and legitimacy of their cause. The ensuing international outrage is now threatening their trade status with the European Union.
A conventional conflict also assumes that both parties are intent on pitting their conventional forces against each other. An opponent can choose to prolong the conflict while preserving her forces. Such a strategy will bear down on Singapore’s weaknesses, wearing down her forces and economy while rallying for a strategic attack at the right time.
This strategy (not tactic) is in fact employed throughout the world by terrorist organisations. The Malaysian armed forces already appears to understand the concept of preserving forces, placing her most valued military assets out of easy reach from Singapore. Their newest Sukhoi-30MKM will be based in northern West Malaysia, yet they still have the range to strike the city state. Their new state of the art Scorpene submarines will be based in Sepanggar Bay in Sabah.
Even in the unlikely case where Singapore does achieve a “swift and decisive victory”, the effects of a war will have far greater and longer lasting effects on her than on any of her neighbours even after a cease fire. Wanting to avenge themselves, an intelligent adversary will bleed Singapore slowly to economic disaster with occasional skirmishes and plenty of rhetoric.
Without a hinterland or natural resources, she will be forced to look further afield to import her daily needs. The increased cost of doing business would drive away investors. Local SMEs already deprived of an adequate domestic market will be put out of business. Increased security measures needed to guard against ex-enemies will strain resources. In this context, war is not the best way to bring down Singapore. Bleeding her to death would be much easier and cheaper. This has not yet happened because it is much more profitable to cooperate with her.
This does not mean that Singapore is not defendable. It is certainly defendable. As an island, invading forces need to possess a significant amphibious or bridging capability since trying to dash the causeway or the second link, which might be blown up, under fire is suicidal.
The urban environment is a huge booby trap and makes it difficult for an invader to control the terrain and progress quickly to key objectives. These are “natural” obstacles that are extremely difficult to overcome even without significant participation of armed resistance. But this article is long enough, and I will present an alternative defence policy later and an alternative NS policy. For now, it suffice to say that MINDEF’s policies are misguided, do not take into account today’s realities and will not bring “swift and decisive victory”. Taxpayer’s money has been wasted in pursuing this current defence strategy and our youths do not need to go through a 2 year NS period.
National Service and the open door policy
National Service and the open door policy
http://kentridgecommon.com/?p=2512
Ramifications of the intertwine between NS and open door policy towards foreigners
By Kelvin Teo ⋅ April 12, 2009
SINGAPORE - On the way back home on the bus from work one day, I overheard a conversation between a Singaporean and his foreign counterpart (FC). It went like this:
FC: What is the purpose of Singaporeans doing National Service?
Local: Supposingly to defend Singapore against perceived threats.
FC: So you will be trained to defend Singapore against potential enemies?Local (in a cynical, albeit jovial tone): If Singapore has a war, I will not be around to protect you. I think you better make your own life raft so that you will be able to jump the Singapore ship and go somewhere safe.
This conversation sums up the deep resentment among NS men towards the open door policy towards foreigners. A typical Singaporean with NS obligations is disadvantaged vis-a-vis his foreign counterparts because of the need to serve yearly in-camp trainings (ICT), which can be up to the maximum of one month. If ICT is not enough, those who fail to pass their physical fitness test (IPPT) have to attend Remedial Training (RT). If the
RT is scheduled on a week day, the NS man has to leave his office early. And there has been feedbacks that employers do ask prospective employees their extent of NS obligations during job interviews. This has happened before in my case, and my peers had the same experience.
Thus, it is not surprising that NS obligations are seen as a form of liability in the face of competition from foreigners who do not have such obligations. I managed to do some catching up with my fellow NS peers when I went back for my annual ICT last week. The news wasn’t that rosy. A good number suffered pay cuts. One got retrenched. On top of ICT, this chap for one reason or another couldn’t pass his IPPT despite the RT training. His work place brought in cheaper foreign workers, and he was unceremoniously told to leave. Now, he is working for a fast food chain, earning $3.50 an hour.
It is not far from the truth to assert that the sight of the SAF100 (an SAF form notifying NS men of their upcoming ICT) is a morale sapper. On the ground, it is not uncommon for NS men to find ways and means to obtain excuse from their NS duties firstly (read MC), and attend to their work committments next.
Ironic, isn’t it? The point of NS is to protect the livelihood of Singaporeans. Except that now it is perceived as a form of threat to livelihood. And it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to assert that this question has gone through the heads of a number of our NS men at one point of time or another - what’s the point of doing NS when my livelihood is already threatened (by the open door policy towards foreigners)? For the cynical ones, they are already asking this question - why should I protect foreigners who threaten my livelihood?
The sad thing is that despite the fanfare of the Five Pillars of Defence, the intertwining of NS with the open door policy towards foreigners is surely not doing any favors to our Psychological Defence (one of the five pillars).
With the current fallout from the global financial crisis, the retrenchment exercise will undoubtedly go into overdrive mode. Due to the downsizing of the current work force, employees are saddled with increased workloads and responsibilities. The last thing on their mind is an SAF100 telling them to report for an ICT or a reminder to attend their RT. And for those keeping their fingers crossed in the hope of keeping their jobs, they wouldn’t want their NS liabilities to affect their evaluation.
Surely now would be the time for our Ministry of Defence (Mindef) to exercise some form of flexibility. For starters, Mindef can exercise more leeway in granting deferment, especially in the case of NS men who have to take on additional responsibilities and workload due to the down-sizing of the work force. Ditto for IPPT training where NS men can be given flexibility to select schedules that best fit the interests of their work place instead of sticking to one chosen fixed schedule under the current system. In fact, the system can be made NS men-friendly in allowing them to pick their most convenient dates.
During this period when the economy is in its downward spiral, shouldn’t MINDEF adopt a flexible approach and assist our NS men instead of hindering them during moments of such crisis? Granted that MINDEF can always come up with this arguement that operational readiness will be affected if it adopts a flexible approach, a good rhetorical question would be - would our military want to appear operationally ready on the surface, but with its soldiers already deflated psychologically? What then is the difference between an army of deflated soldiers and a non-existent army?
http://kentridgecommon.com/?p=2512
Ramifications of the intertwine between NS and open door policy towards foreigners
By Kelvin Teo ⋅ April 12, 2009
SINGAPORE - On the way back home on the bus from work one day, I overheard a conversation between a Singaporean and his foreign counterpart (FC). It went like this:
FC: What is the purpose of Singaporeans doing National Service?
Local: Supposingly to defend Singapore against perceived threats.
FC: So you will be trained to defend Singapore against potential enemies?Local (in a cynical, albeit jovial tone): If Singapore has a war, I will not be around to protect you. I think you better make your own life raft so that you will be able to jump the Singapore ship and go somewhere safe.
This conversation sums up the deep resentment among NS men towards the open door policy towards foreigners. A typical Singaporean with NS obligations is disadvantaged vis-a-vis his foreign counterparts because of the need to serve yearly in-camp trainings (ICT), which can be up to the maximum of one month. If ICT is not enough, those who fail to pass their physical fitness test (IPPT) have to attend Remedial Training (RT). If the
RT is scheduled on a week day, the NS man has to leave his office early. And there has been feedbacks that employers do ask prospective employees their extent of NS obligations during job interviews. This has happened before in my case, and my peers had the same experience.
Thus, it is not surprising that NS obligations are seen as a form of liability in the face of competition from foreigners who do not have such obligations. I managed to do some catching up with my fellow NS peers when I went back for my annual ICT last week. The news wasn’t that rosy. A good number suffered pay cuts. One got retrenched. On top of ICT, this chap for one reason or another couldn’t pass his IPPT despite the RT training. His work place brought in cheaper foreign workers, and he was unceremoniously told to leave. Now, he is working for a fast food chain, earning $3.50 an hour.
It is not far from the truth to assert that the sight of the SAF100 (an SAF form notifying NS men of their upcoming ICT) is a morale sapper. On the ground, it is not uncommon for NS men to find ways and means to obtain excuse from their NS duties firstly (read MC), and attend to their work committments next.
Ironic, isn’t it? The point of NS is to protect the livelihood of Singaporeans. Except that now it is perceived as a form of threat to livelihood. And it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to assert that this question has gone through the heads of a number of our NS men at one point of time or another - what’s the point of doing NS when my livelihood is already threatened (by the open door policy towards foreigners)? For the cynical ones, they are already asking this question - why should I protect foreigners who threaten my livelihood?
The sad thing is that despite the fanfare of the Five Pillars of Defence, the intertwining of NS with the open door policy towards foreigners is surely not doing any favors to our Psychological Defence (one of the five pillars).
With the current fallout from the global financial crisis, the retrenchment exercise will undoubtedly go into overdrive mode. Due to the downsizing of the current work force, employees are saddled with increased workloads and responsibilities. The last thing on their mind is an SAF100 telling them to report for an ICT or a reminder to attend their RT. And for those keeping their fingers crossed in the hope of keeping their jobs, they wouldn’t want their NS liabilities to affect their evaluation.
Surely now would be the time for our Ministry of Defence (Mindef) to exercise some form of flexibility. For starters, Mindef can exercise more leeway in granting deferment, especially in the case of NS men who have to take on additional responsibilities and workload due to the down-sizing of the work force. Ditto for IPPT training where NS men can be given flexibility to select schedules that best fit the interests of their work place instead of sticking to one chosen fixed schedule under the current system. In fact, the system can be made NS men-friendly in allowing them to pick their most convenient dates.
During this period when the economy is in its downward spiral, shouldn’t MINDEF adopt a flexible approach and assist our NS men instead of hindering them during moments of such crisis? Granted that MINDEF can always come up with this arguement that operational readiness will be affected if it adopts a flexible approach, a good rhetorical question would be - would our military want to appear operationally ready on the surface, but with its soldiers already deflated psychologically? What then is the difference between an army of deflated soldiers and a non-existent army?
Our bloated defence budget: What is the perceived threat?
http://wayangparty.com/?p=7607
By Gunslinger, Guest Columnist
While many prominent Singapore bloggers have written about the top civil servant who splurged on a cooking class in Paris and about the inadequacies of the 2009 budget in aiding the needy, none has complained about the 6% dollar increase in the 2009 defense budget to $11.447 billion, which is about 4.7% of 2007’s GDP of S$243.2 billion. The 2008 defence budget of S$10.8 billion is 4.4% of 2007 GDP, and with a nearly flat GDP growth for 2008, Singapore is actually committing more to defence.
GDP Growth Defence Budget (S$ BN) Budget Growth Remarks
FY 2000 10.06% 7.42 -%Actual Expenses
FY 2001 -2.44% 7.82 5.35%Actual Expenses
FY 2002 4.18% 8.2 4.91%Actual Expenses
FY 2003 3.50% 8.24 0.39%Actual Expenses
FY 2004 8.99% 8.62 4.66%Actual Expenses
FY 2005 7.30% 9.25 7.31%Actual Expenses
FY 2006 8.17% 9.63 4.11%Actual Expenses
FY 2007 7.72% 10.01 3.95%Actual Expenses
FY 2008 3.98% 10.8 7.89%Approved Budget
FY 2009 -???% 11.45 6.02%Approved Budget
Source: Ministry of Finance
Why the increase in the defence budget?
To put things in perspective, let’s take a look at how much others spend on defence relative to their GDP. The US spends 4.06% of her GDP on defence but does not include the current war expenses in Afghanistan or Iraq. France spends 2.6% and most other western nations spend 2% or less. Singapore is ranked 20th with 4.5% (2005). It is interesting to note that the top 19 countries are mostly developing nations in trouble spots such as the middle east and Africa. India is a distant #66 with 2.5%. This does not imply that Singapore should follow “western standards” in planning defence budgetary layouts. It only indicates that the government of Singapore must perceive a threat in order to commit such a large proportion to defence in the midst of her worst economic crisis.
Thus, what is the perceived threat? Terrorism is the first obvious answer that comes to mind. The last known “terrorist attack” in Singapore occurred in 1991 with the hijack of Singapore Flight 117 that ended abruptly and violently for the hijackers. A few years ago, Singapore was also threatened with 9/11 style aircraft attacks and embassy bombings. In contrast, some European nations have suffered actual attacks, which includes the 2004 Madrid train bombings and 2005 London bombings. The most recent attack of significance took place in Mumbai claiming the first Singaporean casualty to international terrorism. With the exception of India where the jury is still out, there has been no increase in the following year’s defense budgets of the scale that we now see in Singapore.
In the official publication “Fight Against Terror”, the government claims that while “terrorism does not threaten the existence of Singapore as an independent nation, it has the capacity to inflict serious shocks on our economy and society, causing not only material and human damage, but also psychological injury. It also has the potential to pit different communities against each other, weakening multi-racial, multi-religious character of Singapore that is vital to our success.” (Pg 59). While prevention is the best cure, it must be noted however that there has been no historical precedence showing that foreign investment will flee a country without considering the national capacity to handle the crisis that might ensue. Neither is the strain on the social fabric a uniquely Singaporean phenomenon. On the contrary, many societies, even divided ones have historically shown resilience and cohesion against a common external threat. The nationalistic American rally post 9/11 is an example. Nearer to Singapore, the peace accord between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Rebels after the 2004 Tsunami provides further cause for optimism.
Although the SAF is a key player in counter terrorism, she is not the only player. Her counter terrorist efforts can also be described as incidental. Today, conscripts guard key civilian installations such as Jurong Island without imposing on the budget. The security of air and maritime lanes of communications is a daily job that preoccupies most air and naval forces regardless of terrorism activities although the level of activities and vigilance is possibly higher. Yet, these activities should have been accounted for in the years following the 9/11 attacks. It is also widely recognized that while military forces are important, police forces, national intelligence and non security organizations play equally if not greater roles in attack prevention and post attack rehabilitation. Yet, no similar increase in budgets is noted in other Singaporean ministries in the 2009 budget.
Thus, we can safely conclude that the terrorism is not the dominant factor in augmenting the defense budget in the midst of an economic crisis. The perceived threat has to be external.
What is the perceived threat?
The stated mission of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is for deterrence. And if deterrence is to fail, its mission is to achieve a swift and decisive victory.
The question that one should ask is, deterrence against who and achieve a swift and decisive victory against who? This may be an open secret but let’s go back to basic geopolitics to see which state actor could pose a threat to the security of Singapore.
At the global level, there are currently few countries that have the capability to project their forces to threaten Singapore. In this aspect, the US military is unparalleled. If the US wanted to, the SAF would be of little consequence. The fact that Singapore has extremely close military ties with the US and that all her fighter aircraft are American practically rules out this possibility.
China, while a military giant in her own right, does not have power projection capabilities yet. While she is planning to build her own aircraft carrier(s), her strategy is clearly aimed at containing the US. Her main territorial interest is still Taiwan and keeping the country intact, and preventing the secessionist states of Xinjiang and Tibet from breaking away. Without air support and with long communications line, it is not inconceivable for her to be defeated at sea. Furthermore, any seaborne invading force that approaches narrow straits of Malacca or the narrow waters east of Singapore is exposed to air, sea and land attack. Another option is for China to approach via the land route. In all the described scenarios, an attack by China on Singapore is tantamount to starting World War III. This would not happen without intervention from at least the US. Finally, there is no motive for China to attack the tiny island state thousands of kilometres away.
Russia while trying to re-assert her influence on her borders, is but a pale shadow of her former self, the great Soviet Union. Even at the height of her power, she did not have the capability of projection like the US. Today, she has neither the will, the desire nor the capacity to threaten Singapore.
If you look into India’s strategic outlook, you will find that her priorities are firstly to keep the country together and secondly to contain Pakistan and China. Although she is nuclear and has a formidable conventional force and a somewhat “blue water navy”, she faces immense challenges on any military adventure in south east asia.
Today’s Japan is pacifist, and her forces are not configured for force projection nor for offensive operations. Merely supplying the US forces with a single supply ship had to be debated in Parliament, which eventually led to the cancellation of the said mission.
With regards to the other regional states, most can be ruled out for reasons of distance, lack of military capacity, natural obstacles, or internal problems.
With that, we have only Indonesia and Malaysia, the two closest neighbours to Singapore. Indonesia, the largest Muslim democracy in the world today, is extremely weak militarily relative to her size. Her equipment is old and obsolete with the exception of a few recently bought Sukhois. To highlight the state of derelict, the four Sukhois that were bought in 2003 are inactive, did not have compatible communication systems, and lacked weapons. Furthermore, the Indonesian military is still configured for counter-insurgency and non-conventional operations rather than conventional major combat operations and reforms continue to be extremely slow.
Finally, we come to Malaysia. Separated by a narrow strait, Malaysia is a hot destination for Singaporeans looking for cheap food, thrills and beaches. The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has an impressive order of battle. These include Sukhoi-30MKMs, MiG-29s, F-18s, PT-91 main battle tanks from Poland, Astros MLRS, Scorpene submarines, Leiku class frigates and so on and so forth. Furthermore, relations has not always been good between the two countries. Disagreements between the leaders of both countries with regards to the “Bumiputra” policies led to the ejection of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya in 1965 and several disputes have soured relations in more recent years although relations are currently good. Nonetheless, of all the countries mentioned, Malaysia represents the most likely threat perceived by Singapore leaders.
(Read part 2 of this article “A swift decisive victory” tomorrow)
By Gunslinger, Guest Columnist
While many prominent Singapore bloggers have written about the top civil servant who splurged on a cooking class in Paris and about the inadequacies of the 2009 budget in aiding the needy, none has complained about the 6% dollar increase in the 2009 defense budget to $11.447 billion, which is about 4.7% of 2007’s GDP of S$243.2 billion. The 2008 defence budget of S$10.8 billion is 4.4% of 2007 GDP, and with a nearly flat GDP growth for 2008, Singapore is actually committing more to defence.
GDP Growth Defence Budget (S$ BN) Budget Growth Remarks
FY 2000 10.06% 7.42 -%Actual Expenses
FY 2001 -2.44% 7.82 5.35%Actual Expenses
FY 2002 4.18% 8.2 4.91%Actual Expenses
FY 2003 3.50% 8.24 0.39%Actual Expenses
FY 2004 8.99% 8.62 4.66%Actual Expenses
FY 2005 7.30% 9.25 7.31%Actual Expenses
FY 2006 8.17% 9.63 4.11%Actual Expenses
FY 2007 7.72% 10.01 3.95%Actual Expenses
FY 2008 3.98% 10.8 7.89%Approved Budget
FY 2009 -???% 11.45 6.02%Approved Budget
Source: Ministry of Finance
Why the increase in the defence budget?
To put things in perspective, let’s take a look at how much others spend on defence relative to their GDP. The US spends 4.06% of her GDP on defence but does not include the current war expenses in Afghanistan or Iraq. France spends 2.6% and most other western nations spend 2% or less. Singapore is ranked 20th with 4.5% (2005). It is interesting to note that the top 19 countries are mostly developing nations in trouble spots such as the middle east and Africa. India is a distant #66 with 2.5%. This does not imply that Singapore should follow “western standards” in planning defence budgetary layouts. It only indicates that the government of Singapore must perceive a threat in order to commit such a large proportion to defence in the midst of her worst economic crisis.
Thus, what is the perceived threat? Terrorism is the first obvious answer that comes to mind. The last known “terrorist attack” in Singapore occurred in 1991 with the hijack of Singapore Flight 117 that ended abruptly and violently for the hijackers. A few years ago, Singapore was also threatened with 9/11 style aircraft attacks and embassy bombings. In contrast, some European nations have suffered actual attacks, which includes the 2004 Madrid train bombings and 2005 London bombings. The most recent attack of significance took place in Mumbai claiming the first Singaporean casualty to international terrorism. With the exception of India where the jury is still out, there has been no increase in the following year’s defense budgets of the scale that we now see in Singapore.
In the official publication “Fight Against Terror”, the government claims that while “terrorism does not threaten the existence of Singapore as an independent nation, it has the capacity to inflict serious shocks on our economy and society, causing not only material and human damage, but also psychological injury. It also has the potential to pit different communities against each other, weakening multi-racial, multi-religious character of Singapore that is vital to our success.” (Pg 59). While prevention is the best cure, it must be noted however that there has been no historical precedence showing that foreign investment will flee a country without considering the national capacity to handle the crisis that might ensue. Neither is the strain on the social fabric a uniquely Singaporean phenomenon. On the contrary, many societies, even divided ones have historically shown resilience and cohesion against a common external threat. The nationalistic American rally post 9/11 is an example. Nearer to Singapore, the peace accord between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Rebels after the 2004 Tsunami provides further cause for optimism.
Although the SAF is a key player in counter terrorism, she is not the only player. Her counter terrorist efforts can also be described as incidental. Today, conscripts guard key civilian installations such as Jurong Island without imposing on the budget. The security of air and maritime lanes of communications is a daily job that preoccupies most air and naval forces regardless of terrorism activities although the level of activities and vigilance is possibly higher. Yet, these activities should have been accounted for in the years following the 9/11 attacks. It is also widely recognized that while military forces are important, police forces, national intelligence and non security organizations play equally if not greater roles in attack prevention and post attack rehabilitation. Yet, no similar increase in budgets is noted in other Singaporean ministries in the 2009 budget.
Thus, we can safely conclude that the terrorism is not the dominant factor in augmenting the defense budget in the midst of an economic crisis. The perceived threat has to be external.
What is the perceived threat?
The stated mission of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is for deterrence. And if deterrence is to fail, its mission is to achieve a swift and decisive victory.
The question that one should ask is, deterrence against who and achieve a swift and decisive victory against who? This may be an open secret but let’s go back to basic geopolitics to see which state actor could pose a threat to the security of Singapore.
At the global level, there are currently few countries that have the capability to project their forces to threaten Singapore. In this aspect, the US military is unparalleled. If the US wanted to, the SAF would be of little consequence. The fact that Singapore has extremely close military ties with the US and that all her fighter aircraft are American practically rules out this possibility.
China, while a military giant in her own right, does not have power projection capabilities yet. While she is planning to build her own aircraft carrier(s), her strategy is clearly aimed at containing the US. Her main territorial interest is still Taiwan and keeping the country intact, and preventing the secessionist states of Xinjiang and Tibet from breaking away. Without air support and with long communications line, it is not inconceivable for her to be defeated at sea. Furthermore, any seaborne invading force that approaches narrow straits of Malacca or the narrow waters east of Singapore is exposed to air, sea and land attack. Another option is for China to approach via the land route. In all the described scenarios, an attack by China on Singapore is tantamount to starting World War III. This would not happen without intervention from at least the US. Finally, there is no motive for China to attack the tiny island state thousands of kilometres away.
Russia while trying to re-assert her influence on her borders, is but a pale shadow of her former self, the great Soviet Union. Even at the height of her power, she did not have the capability of projection like the US. Today, she has neither the will, the desire nor the capacity to threaten Singapore.
If you look into India’s strategic outlook, you will find that her priorities are firstly to keep the country together and secondly to contain Pakistan and China. Although she is nuclear and has a formidable conventional force and a somewhat “blue water navy”, she faces immense challenges on any military adventure in south east asia.
Today’s Japan is pacifist, and her forces are not configured for force projection nor for offensive operations. Merely supplying the US forces with a single supply ship had to be debated in Parliament, which eventually led to the cancellation of the said mission.
With regards to the other regional states, most can be ruled out for reasons of distance, lack of military capacity, natural obstacles, or internal problems.
With that, we have only Indonesia and Malaysia, the two closest neighbours to Singapore. Indonesia, the largest Muslim democracy in the world today, is extremely weak militarily relative to her size. Her equipment is old and obsolete with the exception of a few recently bought Sukhois. To highlight the state of derelict, the four Sukhois that were bought in 2003 are inactive, did not have compatible communication systems, and lacked weapons. Furthermore, the Indonesian military is still configured for counter-insurgency and non-conventional operations rather than conventional major combat operations and reforms continue to be extremely slow.
Finally, we come to Malaysia. Separated by a narrow strait, Malaysia is a hot destination for Singaporeans looking for cheap food, thrills and beaches. The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has an impressive order of battle. These include Sukhoi-30MKMs, MiG-29s, F-18s, PT-91 main battle tanks from Poland, Astros MLRS, Scorpene submarines, Leiku class frigates and so on and so forth. Furthermore, relations has not always been good between the two countries. Disagreements between the leaders of both countries with regards to the “Bumiputra” policies led to the ejection of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya in 1965 and several disputes have soured relations in more recent years although relations are currently good. Nonetheless, of all the countries mentioned, Malaysia represents the most likely threat perceived by Singapore leaders.
(Read part 2 of this article “A swift decisive victory” tomorrow)
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